DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 087 035 CS 201 031

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TITLE The Mass Media and Political Culture in Africa.
PUB DATE Aug 73
NOTE 33p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (Fort Collins, Colorado, August 19-22, 1973)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29
DESCRIPTORS *Developing Nations; Field Studies; Government Role; Information Dissemination; Journalism; Nationalism; *News Media; *Newspapers; Political Influences; *Political Issues; Political Power; Politics; *Press Opinion; Propaganda; Social Action; Social Change
IDENTIFIERS *West Africa

ABSTRACT

Editorials in the "West African Pilot", an English-language newspaper published in Lagos, for the years 1945, 1957, 1960, and 1963 (years of crucial importance to Nigeria) were studied to determine the effects of modernity, tradition, fluctuating socioeconomic conditions, and particularly political influences exerted on the press. Each editorial was coded according to its contextual, societal, socio-concept, and evaluative orientation. Most of the editorials treated national/regional issues, politics, and individual persons and groups, and reflected an "official" version of political and social conditions. Assuming the "Pilot" to be representative of the African press, results of this study show that the medium is characterized more by feeling, sensation, and intuition than by critical thinking. (CH)

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THE MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN AFRICA

by

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Paper presented to the International Communication Division, Association for Education in Journalism Convention at Fort Collins, Colorado, August, 1973. Financial support from the Research Committee of the University of Rhode Island aided this study.

CS 001 031

Introduction

About a decade ago, a report on the press in West Africa prepared for an international seminar on the West African press declared, among other things, that:

> The function of the press is to inform, to educate, to entertain and amuse, to examine fairly and critically and to make constructive contributions to thought and discussion on matters of public policy and to provide a forum for the airing of ideas and opinions, whatever their origin and however controversial.[1]

This recommendation is basically similar to the general recommendations of the British Royal Commission on Freedom of the Press[2] and the American Commission on Freedom of the Press[3]. In the opinion of the authors of the report on the West African press, "the peoples of West Africa do not have to choose between good government and a good press" in their advance to a richer and fuller life. The authors, however, hastened to add that "if any newspaper in West Africa is well capitalized, the chances are that it is run either by foreign enterprise or a public agency."[4]

Examined with the economic problems of the African press in mind, the committee's fundamental commitment to the libertarian press ethic represents an ideal goal after which the press should strive. But it is questionable whether the ideal is a legitimate criterion for evaluating the contemporary African press.

Jensen has suggested some general criteria for press

criticism. According to him criticism of the press must be conducted without bias or censure arising from ideological presuppositions; it must take into account the influence of social, political, and cultural forces in the development of the media; and it must take note of the demands, values, aspirations, and life interests of the society in which the media operate.[5]

The rationale posited by Jensen for his criteria is that mass communications are only one of the means through which society forges some adequate relation to its environment. As such, the mass media are not an autonomous entity. In their relation to the status quo, the mass media can be a force either for its disruption or for its perpetuation. This rationale becomes increasingly significant as technology facilitates the growth of media monopolies in developed countries while also encouraging the intrusion of government into media operation in both developed and developing countries.[6] This problem has raised the issue of media evaluation to a new importance, leading many to question the adequacy of the traditional concepts of objectivity,[7] and of the classification of the world press systems into four types.[8]

There are some, for instance, who argue that objectivity is impossible of attainment, while others think that an attitude of acceptance towards objectivity would lead to greater accuracy in reporting. The rejection of objectivity as an attainable or a desirable goal would encourage the popular-

zation of propaganda or advocacy journalism and would take a high toll on professionalism. Of course, to argue that objectivity is attainable in the absolute sense would be denying the basic attributes of language and words as mediators of reality, for as Burke said, "However important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced, first-hand, the whole overall 'picture' is but a construct of our symbol systems."[9]

The issues of objectivity and professionalism are, of course, also tied to those of the relation between the philosophical-political traditions of a society and its press. The "four theories" tradition has been rejected by Mowlana as being too normative, too prescriptive, and too tied to history to provide an adequate framework for the comparative study of press systems.[10] The developing nations which have low political and economic capabilities, he opined, do have a peculiar variety of press systems in which contemporary characteristics of mass communications do not necessarily relate directly to envisaged social, philosophical, and political outcomes.[11]

Lowenstein has also proposed a "two-tiered" typology that may be used to describe the press ownership and press philosophy of a given press system. According to his typology, press ownership may be private, multi-party, or government, while press philosophy may be authoritarian, social-centralist, libertarian, and social-libertarian. He thus also discarded the traditional four-concepts typology of author-

itarian, libertarian, Soviet Communist, and social responsibility, which he considered too inflexible.[12]

Attributes of Mass Communication in Africa

These two positions, denying philosophical fixity, especially among the developing nations, parallel Clapham's general suggestions that most African leaders do not have any coherent political thinking or philosophy save developmental nationalism, and that their political expressions are situationally specific.[13]

These political expressions represent, according to Clapham, what these leaders want other people to hear rather than what they actually think.[14] I would suggest, however, that more accurately, the expressions represent what the leaders think other people want to hear or even a synthesis between what the leaders think and what they think other people want to hear. As such, these expressions do indeed represent the leaders' world views. That these expressions have been disappointing, in many cases, as normative guides to political behavior and have sometimes been belied by reality merely indicates the gap between expressions of Utopia and reality.

Some of the leaders, like Nyerere have emphasized the need for an African leader to be a "realistic idealist," adopting a pragmatic approach to his ultimate goal which should govern his direction at all times",[15] or like Azikiwe, have tried to be idealistic to justify their exist-

ence as human beings and to be materialistic to adapt themselves to the concatenations of a materialistic world.[16] Still others, like Nkrumah, in time, became idealists corrupted by delusions of infallibility, confusing personal judgments with absolute truth and self-esteem with universal public approval.[17] One classification of African leaders on the basis of their perspectives and methods referred to Touré, Nkrumah, and Keita as organizationists; Nyerere, Senghor, Kenyatta, Mamadou Dia, and Luthuli as cultural humanists; and Azikiwe, Awolowo, Balewa, Boigny, and Mboya as marketplace leaders or pragmatists.[18]

These modes of political expression, and political leadership in Africa are important to the study of the African press for the following reasons:

Firstly, the press has been the major medium for the dissemination of these expressions. African countries are not different from other transitional societies in which "journalism develops almost simultaneously with a new awareness of the outside world and a new nationalist self-consciousness."[19]

Secondly, the press was peculiarly fused with the African nationalist movement and to the post-independence political leadership. Almost all African nationalists and influential leaders of post-independence Africa edited newspapers at some point. They used the press to quicken political awakening and to fight colonialism and neo-colonialism.[20]

Thirdly, although African nationalism has been expressed through the press and other media by various leaders through

the same general themes - Pan-Africanism, equality, African socialism, African personality, and Negritude - these leaders put various emphases and interpretations into these different concepts depending on their personality and experiences, their perception of their followers and the peculiar conditions of their societies.[21]

Fourthly, the press, like some of the ideas expressed through it, had origins external to the African continent and has to be reconciled to the contemporary African situation and the traditional modes of communication.[22]

Because a great deal of effort is required in synthesizing those elements of contemporary African society that emanate from tradition and those that have been borrowed, there seems to be a general tendency among nationalists and some writers, to romanticize the past and the future, while the contemporary gets nominal attention. Also, the use of foreign concepts to which African meanings have been attached creates problems of communication.[23]

Fifthly, the mass media in Africa are in a peculiar position of having the responsibility of both aiding or at least sympathizing with current development efforts and of being the critical appraisers of the African society and its leaders. These two responsibilities are not mutually exclusive but they require high professionalization and independence among media personnel. And most of the African press does not have these.[24]

Tradition and Modernity: Evaluating the African Media

The mass media in Africa have a tough job indeed. That job is a miniature representation of Africa's contemporary problems. Mass communication in Africa, as elsewhre, is only part of the total institutional processes that have mutual influences within society. The emergence of the mass media in Africa coincides with the modernization of the political, economic, and cultural institutions in the sense that traditional institutions had to be modified and enlarged to meet the needs of larger societies. Traditionalism, therefore, still has much influence in modern African institutions which were built partially on frameworks supplied by colonial powers.[25]

The economic, political, cultural, and communications institutions have not been clearly differentiated in Africa and the secondary or public spheres of activity tend to fuse with the personal or primary. There is, for instance, an urban-rural dichotomy in which traditional cultural institutions dominate the rural dimension and transitional political institutions dominate the urban dimension. Yet political communication and other political processes go on as though the rural sector does not exist.

Under these conditions, political factions and expressions which invariably find their way into the mass media take on the character of rituals. Inevitably, gaps develop between promise and performance, between dreams and deeds. Often, the conspicuous symbols of modernity in the urban sector are taken for real development when, in fact, the real problem,

like an iceberg, is under the water, in the rural sector.

Political Communication and Political Leadership

The relation between political communication and political leadership in Africa can be analyzed along two main dimensions - the individual communication patterns of the leaders and their views on and their organization and use of institutionalized mass media.

Political flamboyance and grandiloquence have been part of the modern political culture of Africa[26] although such often-quoted statements as the one referring to Ibos as having been especially created by God "to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages" have to be put in their proper context.[27] It seems true, however, that mass-oriented leaders, especially those who have had some direct contact with American militancy[28] have been more flamboyant and grandiloquent than elite-oriented leaders suggesting the influence of mass audiences and tradition, since the mass of the people are more influenced by tradition than the elites.

African political leaders can also be discriminated in terms of how they structure the social reality of the African situation and their roles in that situation. Almost all the leaders see themselves as playing crucial roles and are thus committed to some form of nationalism. Most also take the disaster view of African history seeing the traditional society as the pre-disaster condition, colonization as the disaster, independence as the rescue, while remedy and recovery are seen

as about to be accomplished.[29] The various ways in which the leaders communicate their nationalism essentially represent their basic prescriptions for remedy and recovery.

Some of the leaders emphasize African socialism which represents the economic mode of nationalism; some Negritude or African personality, the cultural mode of nationalism; while others emphasize Pan-Africanism and "democracy", the political modes.[30] African socialism and African personality attempt to discover those attributes in the traditional social and economic organization of Africa which can be brought to bear on contemporary issues. Nyerere of Tanzania appears to be the most original in his application of traditional communalism in interpreting African socialism.[31]

Each of the various strands of Pan-Africanism is a philosophy of necessity and hope although Nkrumah's represented the most idealistic brand and has been vehemently opposed.[32] Negritude, more psychic than any of the other ideologies, is a reaction against racial discrimination and assumes some basic homogeneity of Negroid cultures. It represents Marcus Garvey's black nationalism intellectualized. Senghor of Senegal is the leading exponent of Negritude. Those leaders who have a dualistic view of society have Marxist twists to all these philosophies.[33]

The relation between the mass media and African leaders--their views on the operation of the media, their organization and use of the media - is peculiar in that many of the leaders had been part of the mass media personnel themselves.[34]

Most of the leaders also seem to fear the press, apparently because they have used it and are familiar with its powers. After independence, therefore, most of those nationalist leaders who became leaders of government continued or expanded their influence in the mass media.[35] Those leaders referred to as organizationalists tend towards integrating the mass media in the national political organization and energetically mount controls over them. Nkrumah was a good representative of this group.[36]

Azikiwe represents the group of multiperspectivist leaders[37] who seem to have great faith in press freedom but practice advocacy journalism without integrating the press completely into the national political organization.[38] Azikiwe's faith in and view of the press which parallel Garvey's[39] may have resulted from the structure of Nigeria's society[40] but it is more likely it resulted from his idealistic-materialistic view of the world.[41] Francophone Africa has not seen much nationalist independent press activity except perhaps under Louis Muchard in the late nineteenth century.[42]

Communication and Tradition

Tradition, as pointed out above, still influences much of contemporary Africa. Senghor extolled the Western European intuitive, phenomenological and existential system of knowledge rather than the other traditional strand of European method of knowledge based on reliance on objective analysis

in which the observer remained separated from the observed as nearer the Negro-African way of knowledge and cognitive system. The Negro, he said, approaches his world intuitively through participation and is struck less by the appearance of an object than by its profound reality, less by its sign than by its meaning.[43] In intuitive existentialism and phenomenology, the real coincides with the form in which it is expressed.[44]

Although this mode of cognitive structuring is not unique to the Negro-African,[45] it has implications for mass communications in Africa. The traditional mode of objectification in Africa is either iconic-whereby the medium is able to represent in miniature or in essence the reality being communicated - or else it is symbolic. Even when it is symbolic it usually tends to be analogous using similes and metaphors.[46] Therefore, experience is the basic means to knowledge in traditional Africa. Good speakers or story tellers are those able to vivify their meanings by several analogies.

African politicians and media personnel are aware of the above points and traditional modes of communication enter the modern mass media and modern political communication to an extent of which many are not aware. For instance, one proposal for the fusion of the rural-traditional and the urban-modern media systems of Africa appears to have been done without an adequate analysis of the traditional and modern modes of communication.[47]

Political flamboyance and grandiloquence are all aimed at capitalizing on certain traditional attributes of the African audience. The same is the case for Nkrumah's attempts at political religion.[48] Magic and aura still have great significance for much of the African mass audience. The trouble, of course, is that modern technology has a different set of requirements.[49]

A Case Study: The West African Pilot

Technological modernization which increases the capacity of a society to adapt to non-social environments requires certain modes of communication: it requires that people find answers as to why certain phenomena behave the way they do; it requires role specificity rather than role diffuseness. It requires that people attune themselves to dealing with others with whom they do not have intimate relations. It requires many other things which facilitate man's control or manipulation of his empirical environment - it requires applied science. There appears to be nothing in the African traditional mode of communication which is incompatible with applied science; both use empirical symbols.

The difference between the traditional European method of knowledge and the traditional African method lies in the use of superempirical symbols - "Those for which it is impossible to specify an operation plus an observation that will point to what the speaker means by the symbol."[50]

With those symbols that do not have empirical referents, the European attempts to discover truth through analysis and discourse, the traditional African by intuition. Both the European and the traditional African use "magic" for the control and manipulation of the superempirical environment.

With technological modernization, many phenomena which are hitherto thought to be in the superempirical realm can be shown to be in the empirical and are thus seen to be controllable by technology rather than magic. A great deal of social communication in Africa including some aspects of mass media communication seems to be carried on through the prism of word magic or spell. The influence of tradition is also reflected in the deification of some politicians; in the admiration of grandiloquent politicians and in other ways.

Method: With some of the above ideas in mind, I decided to do some empirical study of the West African Pilot, called the best example of an English language nationalist paper in West Africa,[51] to see how it has been affected by modernity, tradition, and its changing socio-political situation. The Pilot operated from Lagos, the communication center and capital of Nigeria, a country which has been a populous, multi-ethnic country run on a federal governmental structure that allowed strong regions and essentially regionally based parties.[52] The Pilot, though a nationalist paper, remained a private property being neither government-owned nor officially controlled by a political party.[53] It was thus also

the best candidate for the study of the weltanschauung or cognitive reality of a nationalist paper - the paper's view of its world. It is for the above reason also that I studied the editorials rather than the general content of the paper.

Leader of a chain of newspapers owned by Nnamdi Azikiwe, quondam president of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (later "of Nigerian Citizens"), the Pilot was at the center of Nigerian politics for, as has been succinctly pointed out, the elements which made up the Nigerian nationalist movement from the 1940s "were either contained within, or grouped around, the N.C.N.C."[54]

The methodology of the study involved a purposive sampling of editorials written during significant years of the political evolution of Nigeria. Four such years were selected: between 1945, the year of the sixth Pan-African congress and a high-water mark in Nigerian nationalism, and 1963, the year of the signing of the charter of the organization of African Unity by thirty independent African states, the year in which Nigeria also became a Republic - the Nigerian head of state ceasing to be a representative of the queen of England. Two other years, 1957 marking the independence of Ghana and self-government for southern Nigeria, and 1960 marking the independence of Nigeria, were also selected.

Editorial materials were obtained from library depositories and texts of editorials printed out of microfilms. Within each selected year, editorials written in the months of January,

April, August, and December were numbered consecutively to facilitate the sampling of editorial units to be analyzed. There was no other reason for choosing these months except that they make up a third of the year and cover different seasons and like any other set of months spread similarly considered an adequate and representative sample. Because some issues of the newspaper contained more editorial units than others due to changes in editorial policy, the number of editorials per selected year was unequal. Thus, there were 277 editorial units available in 1945, 298 in 1957, 195 in 1960, and 112 in 1963. One hundred editorial units per year were selected out of these numbers. This means that for some years, the sample was almost one of every three editorials while for 1963, for instance, almost all available editorials were included in the sample.

Selected editorials were then content-analyzed to test hunches suggested by theories of political, social, and technological development. Underlying these theories as they relate to communications is the assumption of increasing rationalization of institutions and behavior, and, therefore, increasing cognitive accuracy and orientation to reality.

Among these general suggestions (hunches) are that there is a "widening of horizon" during the modernization process, that the primacy of politics tends to divert attention away from other vital areas of societal concern, that there is increasing attention to ideas and institutions in public com-

munications rather than concrete persons and groups, and that nationalism in the context of colonialism tends to be impatient for change.

The "widening of horizon" was studied by measuring differences in editorial attention to tribal-communal, national-regional, continental, and trans-African international issues. Areas of societal concern was studied by measuring editorial emphases on political, economic, legal-administrative, and cultural issues. Ideation and institutional emphasis was studied by measuring the tendency of editorials to dwell on person-groups or on idea-institutions, and satisfaction with rate of social change was studied by measuring editorial approval of social events.

These operations derived from our definition of political issues as those dealing with political power relations, political groupings and organizations; economic issues as those dealing with technology, production and distribution of goods and services as well as economic groupings and organizations. Legal-administrative issues were defined as dealing with the machinery and administration of government and constitutional structures while cultural issues were those dealing with questions of cultural transmission such as education and socialization, with music, arts and crafts.

Tribal-communal editorials were those focusing on special tribes or local communities; national-regional editorials deal with issues and events that had Nigeria-wide significance

even if the actual arena for the event was regional. Continental-regional editorials are those treating issues from the perspective of their importance for Africa even if the event or issue had a particular African region or country as arena. An example of such an issue was the political independence of Ghana. Other examples were editorials dealing with conflicts between African nations.

Trans-African international editorials deal with events outside the African continent although invariably they were written from the point of view of their implications for Africa. One such editorial dealt with an attempt to assassinate a British prime minister on a visit to Greece with the editorial regretting the attempt but suggesting that the British should learn from that that those fighting for freedom would stop at nothing. An idea-instituion editorial would discuss,for instance, the leadership of a political party, a government, or premiership rather than the persons or groups of persons in such role positions in which case the editorial would be categorized as a person-group one.

The coding system was simple but adequate for the study purposes and involved the placing of each editorial unit into the different categories shown in Tables I to IV. The categories were given nominal symbols as follows: A1 to A4 for those shown in Table I, B1 to B4 for those shown in Table II, C1 and C2 for those in Table III, and D1 to D3 for those in

Table IV. Thus each editorial unit was coded, in my terminology, according to its contextual, societal, socio-concept, and evaluative orientations. The coding itself presented few problems of reliability. It was easy, for instance, to identify an editorial as focused on either a tribal-communal or an international context. More difficult, however, was the identification of an editorial as dealing with a political, economic, legal-administrative, or cultural issue because a specifically economic issue, for example, could be given a political slant. But even here, agreement between two coders was over 80 percentage of the number of editorial units coded.

Results and Discussions: Figures representing percentage distribution of editorials as shown in Tables 1 - 4 indicate the results. Table I shows that the West African Pilot

TABLE I

consistently emphasized national issues. The greatest emphasis on national issues occurred in 1957, probably the year the N.C.N.C. made the last attempt "to develop into a mass party capable of mobilizing countrywide support in sufficient strength to mark it out as the obvious inheritor of power from the British."[55] In contrast to the relative consistency of emphasis on national issues, trans-African issues received high attention only in 1945, just after the war and at the beginning of a period when the N.C.N.C. has been described as most likely to firmly take the central position in the Nigerian political life.[56] Most of the trans-African inter-

national editorials dealt with colonial or racial issues. Continental issues were not particularly emphasized although attention to this category appeared to be increasing steadily. Attention to tribal-communal issues was least in 1957 and 1963, years in which national issues received the greatest attention. Over-all, national-regional issues received the highest attention; continental-regional and trans-African, equal, but relatively little attention; tribal-communal issues received the least attention.

Table II shows that politics was obviously given high priority in the agenda of the West African Pilot. The highest attention was given to this category in 1960, the year

TABLE II

of political independence when the economy received the least attention. Both the economy and culture got more attention before than after independence while legal-administrative issues received their highest attention percentage in 1963, the republic year. Evidently, issues of politics were especially overriding from 1960 on and thus decreased proportionately the attention paid to the economy and even culture. Except for 1960 when little attention was paid to legal-administrative issues, this category received gradually increasing attention, indicating perhaps increasing difficulty with governmental structures. The general pattern appeared to be

that political, economic, legal-administrative, and cultural issues were given decreasing attention in that order. The over-all figures show that politics received about twice the attention given to economics, while legal-administrative issues received about half the attention given to economics but twice that given to culture.

Table III indicates rapidly rising emphasis on persons and groups and a correspondingly decreasing emphasis on ideas and institutions. This pattern could be interpreted as a

TABLE III

reflection of the divisiveness which plagued the N.C.N.C. from 1957 on and of the increasing challenge which the party received both from the Action Group and from the Northern People's Congress.[57] The general tendency was to blame individuals and groups whenever problems arise and in this regard dissident members of the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group party were the "devils". The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and its leadership constituting real power factors in Nigerian politics received little direct editorial attack. The delicate political maneuvering leading to an N.C.N.C.- NPC coalition in 1960 is a possible explanation for this editorial behavior.[58]

Overall, there were twice as many editorials dealing with concrete persons or groups as dealt with ideational concepts

and institutions. Among the four years studied, 1945 and 1960 were relatively editorially balanced in regard to the categories of Table III than 1957 and 1963. There was, of course, more nationalist unity in 1945 than subsequently and apparently the need for personal attacks was much lower. Independence came in 1960 and this fact, perhaps, necessitated greater attempts to create an impression of national unity with a resultant chilling effect on personal editorial attacks. However, if divisiveness accounted for the 1957 editorial imbalance, then one could say that by 1963 Nigeria was already in very bad shape, unity-wise.

The evaluative orientation of editorials shown in Table IV point to an increasing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. Most of the 1945 approval editorials were about the achievements of individuals or communities in education, commerce, and community development. These editorials must have created much motivation among Nigerians. In contrast, most of the disapproval editorials of later years dealt with the political activities of persons or groups. The distribution of editorial approval and disapproval from 1957 onwards shows more editorial disapproval of political and social events. This could be a reflection of either a real deterioration of the

TABLE IV

Nigerian political and social processes or of the frustration

of the West African Pilot over the dwindling influence of the N.C.N.C. However, the good that could have accrued from this reflection of a possibly bad situation was washed off by too much editorial emphasis on the political as well as the tendency to blame individuals and particular groups rather than the more basic factors of political and social structure as causes.

Summary: This exploratory study postulates the relations among the criteria of mass media performance, political structure and political leadership, and institutional and cognitive traditionalism and modernity in a transitional environment. The operation of mass communications in Africa as elsewhere is hemmed in by a myriad of factors which mark it out as only one of several social institutions with a past, a present, and a future.

The editorial policy of the West African Pilot, a nationalist newspaper of some renown, seemed originally shaped by the African and American experience of its founder, as shown by the 1945 emphasis on national and trans-African issues. Although editorial distribution in the West African Pilot indicated from the beginning an emphasis on racial and colonial issues, the editorial outlook seemed more balanced in that local, national, and international issues were dealt with, although the political, and to a lesser extent, the economic dimensions dominated. But there were relatively more cultural issues

discussed editorially in the pre-1960 period than in the post-independence period when personal politics seemed to have gained ascendancy. It could be said, therefore, that the relatively wide perspectivistic appraoch of the earlier period later gave way, under Nigerian internal pressures, to a national, socio-political orientation that blamed individuals and groups for problems which seem essentially to be structural. It is apparent that even the Pilot, credited with being the most outward-looking of Nigerian papers[59], was generally inward-looking in its editorials and indulged in the journalism of personal and group abuse which tended to blur the real and more fundamental social issues.

If the Pilot represented the best of Africa's nationalist press, then one could say that in the diction of Jungian psychology, feeling, sensation, and intuition, rather than critical thinking, characterized most of the African political press. No wonder then that the press provided important politcal leadership but was unable to provide enough hard-headed critical analysis of the society. Adequate critical analysis of society thus appears to be an essential index of professionalism in African mass communications.

The press, of course, can be used for any of several purposes including the acquisition of political power. In a society in which there is an adequate supply of other types of

media especially the independent press and an adequate supply of educated political actors, the purposes of a partisan political press could be clearly obvious. But in a transitional society where the political and/or the government press constitutes the bedrock of the press system, partial analysis of social issues for political advantage could indeed be disastrous. In a plural, transitional society like Nigeria with a weak national political framework and where competing sections of the political press could coincide or run parallel with governmental or regional structures, different sections of the country could get different views of national reality through the press. In such a situation, it would be only a matter of time when the seams would come apart and the center would fail to hold.

Equally significant, however, is the suggestion from this study that a mass medium like political persons would abandon issues and ideologies that are less immediately relevant once it encounters more immediate and concrete problems and challenges.

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TABLE I

Contextual Orientation of Editorials

Context	Year 1945	1957	1960	1963	
	Percent				
Tribal-communal	12	9	13	4 =	38
National-regional	51	79	66	72 =	268
Continental-regional	7	7	14	17 =	45
International-trans-African	30	5	7	7 =	49
Total	100	100	100	100	400

$\chi^2 = 88.40$, df = 9; $p < .001$

TABLE II

Societal Orientation of Editorials

Social Component	Year 1945	1957	1960	1963	
	Percent				
Political	42	41	70	52	= 205
Economic	34	27	17	20	= 98
Legal-Administrative	11	19	8	21	= 59
Cultural	13	13	5	7	= 38
Total	100	100	100	100	= 400

$\chi^2 = 34.89$, df = 9; $p < .001$

TABLE III

Socio-Concept Orientation

Object	Year 1945	1957	1960	1963	
	Percent				
Persons/Group	39	78	64	87	= 268
Idea/Institution	61	22	36	13	= 132
Total	100	100	100	100	= 400

$\chi^2 = 59.28$, df = 3; $p < .001$

TABLE IV

Evaluative Orientation of Editorials

Evaluation	Year 1945	1957	1960	1963
	Percent			
Approval	35	27	16	25 = 103
Disapproval	26	47	55	45 = 173
Suggestion (neutral)	39	26	29	30 = 12
Total	100	100	100	100 = 400

$\chi^2 = 20.58$, df = 6; $p < .005$